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Washington, D. C. 20505

19 September 1980

# ALERT MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Council

SUBJECT:

Polish Trends and Soviet Union Perceptions and Reactions

Soviet military activity eads	25X′
me to believe that the Soviet leadership is preparing to intervene	
militarily in Poland if the Polish situation is not brought under	
control in a manner satisfactory to Moscow. Recent events in	
Poland itself suggest that the Kania regime may encounter severe	
difficulties in meeting Moscow's requirements.	25X´
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#### THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

19 September 1980

#### ALERT MEMORANDUM\*

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Polish Trends and Soviet Union Perceptions and Reactions

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25X1	The Soviets are likely to	
	give Kania some additional time to master the situation. But if current trends continue unabated and the Polish Party's control over the nation or Poland's role in the Warsaw Pact are called into question, the Soviets will threaten or employ	
25X1	military force.	
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	*The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued by the Director of Central Intelligence on behalf of the Intelligence	
	Community. Its purpose is to ensure that senior policymakers are aware of impending potential developments that may have serious	
	implications for US interests. It is not a prediction that these developments will occur. This memorandum has been coordinated at	
	the working level with CIA, DIA, NSA, Army, Air Force, State/INR,	
	and the Strategic Warning Staff.	
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	The Soviets have publicly endorsed Kania and could hardly have expected him to have brought the situation under control within	
<b>(1</b> <b>(1</b>	two weeks of his appointment. The situation has continued to deteriorate, and another confrontation between the regime and workers cannot be ruled out. A renewed confrontation could be precipitated by the workers'	28
	tary pressure on Poland. If the Soviet Union concludes the regime is losing control of the country or that Poland's loyalty to the Warsaw Pact is in question, they will intervene militarily.  In the immediate future Moscow will mount increased public warnings and heightened propaganda campaigns decrying the new unions, and may	25
(1	arrange visits to Warsaw by high-level Soviet leaders. Moscow will also continue to take measures to enhance its readiness to intervene militarily in Poland.	2
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There are important considerations which argue against Soviet intervention. Either with or without the cooperation of the Kania regime, military intervention undoubtedly would be perceived in Moscow as a last resort. Nevertheless, the geopolitical importance of Poland and Moscow's determination to preserve Soviet influence in the bloc will be overriding considerations.

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